(a) Everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference.

(b) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his or her choice.

(c) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph (b) may be subject to restrictions on specific grounds, as established in international law, including for the protection of national security.

(d) No restriction on freedom of expression or information on the ground of national security may be imposed unless the government can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national security interest. The burden of demonstrating the validity of the restriction rests with the government.

(a) Any restriction on expression or information must be prescribed by law. The law must be accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is unlawful.

(b) The law should provide for adequate safeguards against abuse, including prompt, full and effective judicial scrutiny of the validity of the restriction by an independent court or tribunal.

Any restriction on expression or information that a government seeks to justify on grounds of national security must have the genuine purpose and demonstrable effect of protecting a legitimate national security interest.

To establish that a restriction on freedom of expression or information is necessary to protect a legitimate national security interest, a government must demonstrate that:

(a) the expression or information at issue poses a serious threat to a legitimate national security interest;

(b) the restriction imposed is the least restrictive means possible for protecting that interest; and

(c) the restriction is compatible with democratic principles.

(a) A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a country's existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent overthrow of the government.

(b) In particular, a restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate if its genuine purpose or demonstrable effect is to protect interests unrelated to national security, including, for example, to protect a government from embarrassment or exposure of wrongdoing, or to conceal information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to entrench a particular ideology, or to suppress industrial unrest.

In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the country and the existence of which is officially and lawfully proclaimed in accordance with both national and international law, a state may impose restrictions on freedom of expression and information but only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and only when and for so long as they are not inconsistent with the government's other obligations under international law.

In no case may a restriction on freedom of expression or information, including on the ground of national security, involve discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, nationality, property, birth or other status.

No one may be subjected to any sort of restraint, disadvantage or sanction because of his or her opinions or beliefs.

Subject to Principles 15 and 16, expression may be punished as a threat to national security only if a government can demonstrate that:

(a) the expression is intended to incite imminent violence;

(b) it is likely to incite such violence; and

(c) there is a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence.

(a) Subject to Principles 15 and 16, the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression shall not be considered a threat to national security or subjected to any restrictions or penalties. Expression which shall not constitute a threat to national security includes, but is not limited to, expression that:

(i) advocates non-violent change of government policy or the government itself;

(ii) constitutes criticism of, or insult to, the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, government, agencies or public officials;

(iii) constitutes objection, or advocacy of objection, on grounds of religion, conscience or belief, to military conscription or service, a particular conflict, or the threat or use of force to settle international disputes;

(iv) is directed at communicating information about alleged violations of international human rights standards or international humanitarian law.

(b) No one may be punished for criticizing or insulting the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, government, agency or public official unless the criticism or insult was intended and likely to incite imminent violence.

Expression may not be prevented or punished merely because it transmits information issued by or about an organization that a government has declared threatens national security or a related interest.

Expression, whether written or oral, can never be prohibited on the ground that it is in a particular language, especially the language of a national minority.

Governments are obliged to take reasonable measures to prevent private groups or individuals from interfering unlawfully with the peaceful exercise of freedom of expression, even where the expression is critical of the government or its policies. In particular, governments are obliged to condemn unlawful actions aimed at silencing freedom of expression, and to investigate and bring to justice those responsible.

Everyone has the right to obtain information from public authorities, including information relating to national security. No restriction on this right may be imposed on the ground of national security unless the government can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic society to protect a legitimate national security interest.

A state may not categorically deny access to all information related to national security, but must designate in law only those specific and narrow categories of information that it is necessary to withhold in order to protect a legitimate national security interest.

In all laws and decisions concerning the right to obtain information, the public interest in knowing the information shall be a primary consideration.

The state is obliged to adopt appropriate measures to give effect to the right to obtain information. These measures shall require the authorities, if they deny a request for information, to specify their reasons for doing so in writing and as soon as reasonably possible; and shall provide for a right of review of the merits and the validity of the denial by an independent authority, including some form of judicial review of the legality of the denial. The reviewing authority must have the right to examine the information withheld.

No person may be punished on national security grounds for disclosure of information if (1) the disclosure does not actually harm and is not likely to harm a legitimate national security interest, or (2) the public interest in knowing the information outweighs the harm from disclosure.

No person may be subjected to any detriment on national security grounds for disclosing information that he or she learned by virtue of government service if the public interest in knowing the information outweighs the harm from disclosure.

Once information has been made generally available, by whatever means, whether or not lawful, any justification for trying to stop further publication will be overridden by the public's right to know.

Protection of national security may not be used as a reason to compel a journalist to reveal a confidential source.

Any restriction on the free flow of information may not be of such a nature as to thwart the purposes of human rights and humanitarian law. In particular, governments may not prevent journalists or representatives of intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations with a mandate to monitor adherence to human rights or humanitarian standards from entering areas where there are reasonable grounds to believe that violations of human rights or humanitarian law are being, or have been, committed. Governments may not exclude journalists or representatives of such organizations from areas that are experiencing violence or armed conflict except where their presence would pose a clear risk to the safety of others.

Any person accused of a security-related crime involving expression or information is entitled to all of the rule of law protections that are part of international law. These include, but are not limited to, the following rights:

(a) the right to be presumed innocent; 

(b) the right not to be arbitrarily detained;

(c) the right to be informed promptly in a language the person can understand of the charges and the supporting evidence against him or her; 

(d) the right to prompt access to counsel of choice; 

(e) the right to a trial within a reasonable time; 

(f) the right to have adequate time to prepare his or her defence; 

(g) the right to a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial court or tribunal;

(h) the right to examine prosecution witnesses;

(i) the right not to have evidence introduced at trial unless it has been disclosed to the accused and he or she has had an opportunity to rebut it; and

(j) the right to appeal to an independent court or tribunal with power to review the decision on law and facts and set it aside.

All remedies, including special ones, such as habeas corpus or amparo, shall be available to persons charged with security-related crimes, including during public emergencies which threaten the life of the country, as defined in Principle 3.

(a) At the option of the accused, a criminal prosecution of a security-related crime should be tried by a jury where that institution exists or else by judges who are genuinely independent. The trial of persons accused of security-related crimes by judges without security of tenure constitutes a prima facie violation of the right to be tried by an independent tribunal.

(b) In no case may a civilian be tried for a security-related crime by a military court or tribunal. 

(c) In no case may a civilian or member of the military be tried by an ad hoc or specially constituted national court or tribunal.

Expression shall not be subject to prior censorship in the interest of protecting national security, except in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the country under the conditions stated in Principle 3.

A person, media outlet, political or other organization may not be subject to such sanctions, restraints or penalties for a security-related crime involving freedom of expression or information that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the actual crime.

Nothing in these Principles may be interpreted as restricting or limiting any human rights or freedoms recognized in international, regional or national law or standards.

• Laurel Angus, Executive Director, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
• Lawrence W Beer, Professor of Civil Rights, Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College, USA
• Geoffrey Bindman, solicitor, Bindman and Partners, London, UK
• Dana Briskman, Legal Director, Association for Civil Rights, Israel
• Richard Carver, Africa Programme Consultant, ARTICLE 19, London, UK
• Yong-Whan Cho, Duksu Law Offices, Seoul, South Korea
• Sandra Coliver, Law Programme Director, ARTICLE 19, Washington DC, USA
• Peter Danowsky, Danowsky & Partners, Stockholm, Sweden
• Emmanuel Derieux, Professor of Media Law, University of Paris 2, and Co-editor, Legipresse, Paris, France
• Frances D'Souza, Executive Director, ARTICLE 19, London, UK
• Elizabeth Evatt AC, member, UN Human Rights Committee and legal consultant, Sydney, Australia
• Felipe Gonzalez, Professor of Law, Diego Portales University, Santiago, Chile and Legal Officer for Latin America, International Human Rights Law Group, Washington DC
• Paul Hoffman (Conference Chair), media lawyer, Los Angeles, USA
• Gitobu Imanyara, Advocate of the High Court of Kenya, and Editor-in-Chief, Nairobi Law Monthly, Kenya
• Lene Johannessen, Media Project, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
• Raymond Louw, Chairman, Freedom of Expression Institute, Johannesburg, South Africa
• Laurence Lustgarten, Professor of Law, University of Southampton, UK
• Paul Mahoney, Deputy Registrar, European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe.
• Gilbert Marcus, Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa
• Kate Martin, Executive Director, Center for National Security Studies, Washington DC, USA
• Juan E Mendez, General Counsel, Human Rights Watch, New York, USA
• Branislav Milinkovic, editor, Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
• Etienne Mureinik, Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
• Ann Naughton, Publications Director, ARTICLE 19, London, UK
• Mamadou N'Dao, human rights lawyer and consultant, Panos Institute, Dakar, Senegal
• Andrew Nicol, QC, Doughty Street Chambers, London, UK
• David Petrasek, Mandate and Legal Policy Adviser, Amnesty International, London, UK
• Laura Pollecut, Executive Director, Lawyers for Human Rights, Pretoria, South Africa
• John Sangwa, Simeza, Sangwa & Associates, Lusaka, and member, Faculty of Law, University of Zambia
• Sergei Sirotkin, Human Rights Commission, Moscow, Russia
• Malcolm Smart, Deputy Executive Director, ARTICLE 19, London, UK
• Tanya Smith, UN Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, Switzerland
• Soli Sorabjee, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India, New Delhi, India
• K S Venkateswaran, advocate, Indian Bar, and member, Law Faculty, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland
• Kerim Yildiz, Executive Director, Kurdish Human Rights Project, London, UK
• Kyu Ho Youm, Professor, Cronkite School of Journalism and Telecommunication, Arizona State University, USA